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Abstract: This article discusses the importance of emotions to China’s public life and 
the way in which the Internet and news media channels have publicized emotional 
outbursts by the public in China in recent years. An agonistic public sphere is being 
formed, which pivots on the expression of emotions, especially hatred, resentment, 
anger and compassion, both on the Internet and in the news media. As a result, 
conflicting interests are contested and paradoxes in society are exposed. This 
development is close to what radical democracy theories conceptualize as an agonistic 
public sphere. This emotional dimension in public life is a crucial means for China’s 
subordinated citizens to strive to seize resources to change the current hierarchy in 
society. The formation of an agonistic public sphere democratizes communication 
processes, opens a space for public participation and gives voice to the public who are 
otherwise silent. The expression of emotions has the potential to break down the 
Chinese Communist Party’s hegemony. 
 




This article offers an understanding of the political implications of the public 
expression of emotions and of the role of the Internet and news media in making this 
function in China.
1
 Looking back at events and incidents in China in recent years, it 
is obvious that public life in China is imbued with a sentimental quality. Public events, 
such as the case of Xiao Yueyue
2
 and the Wenzhou high-speed train accident,
3
 gave 
rise to emotional outbursts by a large number of online users on issues which did not 
directly affect them, and which had happened to people who were not their kin. The 
outpouring of emotions – especially hatred, resentment, anger and compassion – over 
these events triggered further reflections on Chinese society. Governments, 
commercial corporations, and even individuals were pressurized into dealing with the 
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problems concerned. The mainstream mass media picked up on online sentiments, 
allying themselves with online users in exercising the power of emotion against the 
powerful and privileged. If one carefully examines these cases and borrows Jasper 
and his collaborators’ typology, one can find both reflex emotions, especially anger 
and hatred, which arise as a response to certain events and information, as well as 
moral emotions, such as compassion and outrage, which are more context-related.
4
 
Both types of emotion can be seen on the individual and collective levels. The 
increasing number of cases of this kind in recent years makes it a relevant and 
pertinent inquiry to understand not only how these emotions can be expressed in 
public in an authoritarian country but also what the expression of these emotions 
means to Chinese society. 
This article contends that the collaboration between the Internet and news media 
makes the expression of such emotions possible, leading to the formation of an open 
public space between the state and civil society. In this public space, the Internet 
provides room for the public to express emotions, while news media coverage ensures 
that sentimental expressions reach a wider public. The space which is opened up 
appears to be identical to what radical democracy theories conceptualize as an 
agonistic public sphere, in which plural and even conflicting interests are expressed, 
presented and contested. In this public sphere, with the help of the Internet, 
once-atomized individuals are now connected and able to act as collective units, 
expressing their sentiments about social issues and finding resonance with other 
individuals’ emotions and views. In contrast to the ideal of rationality, emotions 
become an important element in this sphere. This does not however mean that reason 
is lacking nor that it is unnecessary in Chinese society. At the present time, emotions 
have been the driving force of a variety of social movements and issues. Sentimental 
expressions reflect the growing resistance against social inequality and injustice and 
people’s mounting desire to expose social problems in order to change society. The 
formation of an agonistic public sphere democratizes communication processes, opens 
a space for public participation and gives voice to the public who are otherwise silent. 
 
Emotions and public life 
 
The importance of emotions to public life is controversial. One prominent view is that 
a healthy public life should avoid emotions; the classic Habermasian concept of the 
public sphere is representative of such a view. Habermas sees the public sphere as an 
open social space that appeared during the rise of capitalism in Western Europe.
5
 It is 
a space between government and civil society and independent of the state. The public 
sphere is premised on the tenets and practices of the liberal market economy, enjoys 
free information access, and links private domains and public authorities. Rationality, 
rather than emotions, is central to this concept of the public sphere. Habermas regards 
rational and reasoned public discourse as a driving force for a well-functioning public 
sphere, where rational and critical debates on public matters through private persons’ 




On the other hand, however, the importance of emotions in public life has been 
acknowledged. Emotions are deemed to permeate political action in general and social 
movements in particular. Emotions come with and even drive social action, setting up 
goals for such action.
6
 Emotions are vital in an agonistic public sphere, in contrast to 
the Habermasian public sphere, sees emotions as vital. The idea of the agonistic 
public sphere, proposed by Chantal Mouffe,
7
 stresses the importance of passion in 
democracy.
8
 For Mouffe, the public sphere provides a space where adversaries 
compete for hegemonic power. This contest occurs among groups of people 
contending for what they believe to be right. This view holds that the ideal of 
rationality does not match reality. From this perspective, emotions are seen as an 
alternative type of democratic practice. The public sphere should accommodate 
passions and should enable the expression of collective passions.
9
 Mouffe argues that 
it is important to ‘mobilize passions towards collective design’ rather than strive for 
rational discussion-based consensus.
10
 Similar arguments can be found in studies on 
the democratic role of the Internet. Researchers argue for the existence of an 
alternative public sphere online, which contrasts with the Habermasian public sphere 
placing an emphasis on rational and critical discussions.
11
 Scholars have advanced 
the idea that contestation, emotions and even violence can be seen as a type of 
democratic practice of people in Western societies, with positive political possibilities, 
especially when the ideals of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere seem to be 




The above discussions reveal the two sides of the argument over whether and 
how emotions matter to public life. Within this larger framework, this article shifts the 
scenario from Western democratic societies to the Chinese non-democratic context 
and discusses the political implications of emotions in China.  
 
Emotions and the Internet in China 
 
Chinese society has seen the proliferation of emotions – in particular feelings of 
insecurity and injustice, anger towards and hatred of the rich and the powerful. From 
the 1980s’ economic reform onwards, changes in the economic sector have been 
accompanied by social problems, such as the widening gap between the rich and the 
poor as well as between urban and rural areas, environmental deterioration, high 
living costs, rapidly rising inflation, and an ever-increasing vacuum in the welfare 
system.
13
 These problems have made the people feel insecure and uncertain about the 
future of China. Beijing has tried to tackle these problems but has not been very 
successful. Many of these problems have become severe since the turn of the 21st 
century. 
There has been an increase in public resentment and anger towards the powerful 
and privileged. Anger is evident in most social layers, especially in the rural 
population, the working class and peasantry.
14
 The feeling of unfairness on the part of 
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China’s ‘lost generation’ has magnified their resentment towards corruption, injustice 
and the lack of life opportunities.
15
 Traditional (ancient) ways to express a feeling of 
injustice, such as ordinary people kneeling down to beg for justice, are often seen in 
public events,
16
 as exemplifed by the case of Qian Yunhui.
17
 Tensions exist among 
social groups located on different rungs of the social hierarchy and holding different 
views on economic reforms and the future of China, such as new leftists and rightists. 
The possibility for different social groups to carry out a rational dialogue under such 
circumstances appears slim. 
The Internet has been a key site for the explicit expression of popular emotions 
and it has unexperienced rapid development in China since the beginning of the 21st 
century, under the ‘cautious support’ of the Chinese authorities.
18
 The number of 
Internet users reached 618 million in December 2013.
19
 A convergence between the 
telecom and Internet industries after 2008 has made the Internet accessible through 
mobile devices.
20
 The decreasing cost of Internet access has lowered the entry 
barriers to connection to the Internet. A phenomenon unique in China – the prevalence 
of counterfeit mobile phones (despite issues concerning patent and copyright) – has 
further increased the possibilities for the poor to access the Internet via mobile 
devices. 
The decentralized technological architecture of the Internet and its Web 2.0 tools 
have changed the cultural conditions in which Chinese people communicate with one 
another and get informed. At the same time, these technologies and tools have created 
obstacles for the political authorities in the control of information production and 
dissemination. Active online communication has become a crucial part of China’s 
public life. Although, like elsewhere, a large amount of entertainment content prevails 
online, the Internet in China still hosts heated discussions on sociopolitical issues. The 
topics of such discussions range from social injustice to all kinds of events such as the 
Olympic Games. 
The Internet’s great capacity for connectivity enables once-atomized individuals 
to collectively resist the dominance of certain social groups or actors. At the end of 
2011, for instance, Internet users, among whom were activists, ordinary citizens and 
journalists, organized a networked movement – visiting Chen Guangcheng
21
 – in 
order to get him released. In addition, the Internet also offers a platform where users 
can make good use of social resources for certain purposes. Two prominent examples 
of this are the ‘Free lunch for children’ (免费午餐) and the ‘Microblogs combat 
child-trafficking’ (微博打拐) campaigns,22 which were launched on the social media 
platform microblogs (微博, the Chinese version of Twitter). The two campaigns 
helped poor children in rural areas and pushed the police to deal with the problem of 
kidnapping in 2011. 
Cyberspace allows individuals to express their interests and feelings about issues 
affecting society. Enjoying the advantages offered by the Internet, such individual 
expressions can stir up collective sentiments, especially with the help of members of 
the elite. In particular, the disadvantaged and underprivileged, such as peasants, 
laid-off workers, migrant labour and residents whose houses are threatened with 
demolition or already demolished, lack access to mainstream media outlets such as 
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newspapers, magazines and broadcasters. Having access to the Internet enables them 
to express private interests and to obtain publicity. Publicity of this kind may snowball 
individual feelings of injustice into collective sentiments; the public sharing of certain 
experiences can generate moral emotions such as compassion and outrage. The case 
of Qian Minqi
23
 is a prominent example. After 10 years of fruitless attempts to obtain 
justice, Qian Mingqi, an unemployed man whose home was illegally demolished by 
the local authority, taught himself to use the Internet and established profiles on social 
media sites. In doing so, he made public the injustice he had experienced and hoped to 
get help from those who were more powerful and had more resources than himself, 
such as lawyers and journalists.
24
 Such expressions of individual experience can 
easily strike a collective chord among Internet users who share the same feelings 
about certain social groups or institutions, such as local governments, civic officials 
and the rich. The stirring of online public sentiment is especially obvious when there 
are issues involving injustice and conflicts between the powerless and the powerful.
25
 
Online hatred by the powerless towards the powerful and privileged can even 
construct a logic that sees sociopolitically disadvantaged individuals as heroes and the 
advantaged as villains. For instance, around half of the messages about the case of 
Qian Mingqi expressed doubts, anger and hatred.
26
 After the bombing carried out by 
Qian Mingqi in 2011, in which he died, the followers of his microblog account rapidly 
increased to 30,000, while both Internet users and passersby at scene of the bombing 
hailed Qian’s violent act.
27
 In cyberspace, Qian is emotionally and schematically 
labelled a ‘hero’ or ‘warrior’ who dared to oppose authority in public. A simple search 
using the keyword ‘Qian Mingqi’ on microblogs would easily reveal many posts with 
sentiments similar to this: 
 
For those who applauded Yang Jia’s killing of policemen three years ago,
28
 they would 
applaud Qian Mingqi and Xia Junfeng
29
 again today, calling them heroes. ‘Being not 
afraid to die’ is the last powerful weapon the powerless can adopt to protest against the 
powerful: either votes or dynamite. 
 
In fact the same situation had happened during the case of Deng Yujiao
30
 back in 
2009. Public anger towards officials underlie the online public’s interpretation of 
these events.
31
 Indeed, individuals’ strong emotions, especially anger or hatred 
towards the rich and powerful, prevail online and become prominent collective 
sentiments. As a result, emotional expressions and conflicting sentiments rather than 
rational deliberative discussions characterize China’s Internet communication.
32
 
When emotions are stirred or heated, the distinction between public and private 
domains on the Internet is often blurred. In daily use, a considerable number of 
Chinese Internet users appear to have no qualms about revealing private information 
about themselves and others online, turning cyberspace into an intimate space. The 
boundaries of the online private sphere are broken down when such private 
information attracts extensive attention from other Internet users or is actually hunted 
down by Internet users who engage in ‘human flesh search’ (人肉搜索)33 which 
leads to more exposure of private matters to the public. It is not unusual to see 
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individuals’ private personal posts forwarded indiscriminately by Internet users, 
leading to private issues escalating into public affairs and involving popular emotional 
outbursts. The case of Guo Meimei
34
 in 2011 is an excellent example of this. Internet 
users stumbled across private information about her luxurious lifestyle that she had 
published online. They became sceptical of the sources of her wealth, tapping into 
collective anger about corruption. These doubts drove the offline news media to pay 
more attention to this case. The coverage in the news media led to official 
investigations into some officials and departments. 
Ironically, such popular emotional outbursts and breaches of privacy and have 
even become a powerful weapon to be used to crack down corruption. From Zhou 
Jiugen
35
 in 2008 to Yang Dacai
36
 in 2012, casual news photos of them first revealed 
that they wore luxury watches and smoked expensive cigarettes. The subsequent 
human flesh search by Internet users revealed that they owned many luxury watches 
which they would have been unable to afford on their salary. These findings triggered 
Internet users’ anger and hatred towards corruption and corrupt officials. The scandal 
brought those officials down: in both cases the two officials stepped down less than 
one month after their exposure online. In some cases attacks on corruption are largely 
the result of disclosure of corrupt officials by their mistresses, and Internet users’ 
anger in response to such disclosures. A prominent example is the case of Lei Zhengfu, 
a local official in Chongqing. Iin 2012, his mistress revealed details of his private life 
and she posted sex videos online. He was removed from his position and later arrested 
and sentenced for corruption. 
In addition, the online expression of emotions reflects a plurality of social 
discourses which may be conflicting. The contestation of discourses is obvious on 
occasions involving individuals or groups who hold different views about 
socio-political issues. For example, it is not unusual to see China’s leftists (who 
support the CCP’s orthodox auhoritarian rule and oppose commercialization) and 
rightists (who support the idea of political reform and marketization) abuse each other 
in cyberspace. They often use abusive, profane and irrational language, in spite of the 
fact that many are intellectuals such as university professors. In 2012, for example, 
during a famous online debate between leftists and rightsts, a university professor 
criticized two leftists who supported the CCP by making the following comments on 
SinaWeibo: ‘who will continue to support such an evil regime. Kong Qingdong and 
Sima Nan, these sons of bitches endlessly whitewash and polish the image of such a 
villain. Conscienceless, shameless and savage!’. Though such conflicts are often 
characterized by little exchange of ideas and without reaching any consensus, they do 
reflect the plurality of public opinion on some important issues, such as political 
reform in China. These diverse views, by contrast, are absent from coverage by the 
traditional media. 
 
Channelling emotions by the news media 
 
The Internet offers a platform for the release of emotions, whereas China’s traditional 
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media outlets are unlikely to function as outlets for exploring these wider social 
processes and feelings. This is firstly because the Chinese media continue to stay 
under the control of the party, in spite of commercialization. Media marketization has 
not resulted in media liberalization.
37
 Despite the proliferation of commercial media 
outlets, media content is constrained by restrictions on reporting. Some avant-garde 
genres of journalism, such as investigative journalism, which have emerged give 
attention to sociopolitical issues. Nevertheless, the journalistic autonomy they enjoy is 
quite limited. Social anger and resentment are among the topics which are taboo. 
Moreover, the news media in China pursue maximal profits,as they do elsewhere. 
This echoes Habermas’s pessimistic view of the mass media  functioning as the 
public sphere in a commercial context. After 30 years of media commercialization, the 
Chinese media market is now in the hands of dozens of gigantic state-owned media 
corporations, such as the Nanfang Daily Press Group and the Shanghai Media Group. 
The imperative to maximize profits drives the media to take into account the interests 
of their advertisers and subscribers, as well as that of the state. Social groups who 
have cause for resentment towards dominant social elites are usually neither 
advertisers’ target consumers nor the media’s subscribers. For example, a deputy 
editor-in-chief of a metropolitan daily complained in 2012 that no advertisers wanted 
to sponsor their reports on migrant workers, because on the one hand, advertisers 
thought migrant workers were not their target consumers and on the other they were 
not willing to publish their advertisements alongside reports on such a politically 
sensitive topic. 
The dysfunctional nature of China’s news media in reporting on these public 
sentiments is also associated with the elitism of Chinese journalists and their position 
in cultural production. Chinese journalists are part of a university-educated cultural 
elite, members of whom have a monopoly over the production and distribution of 
cultural products. They are therefore intellectuals with arbitrary symbolic power, 
according to Garnham’s definition.
38
 Because of improved economic conditions, they 
have become part of the middle class that has recently emerged in Chinese society.
39
 
Using Gramsci’s idea of the ‘organic intellectual’,
40
 the elitism of Chinese journalists 
prevents them from becoming organic intellectuals of the lower social classes who 
speak for the latter’s rights and in their best interests. Taking these factors together, 
the traditional media in China are unlikely to be able to channel the emotions of social 
groups who oppose the ruling class in order to challenge the status quo. 
However, in recent years it has become noticeable that some commercial news 
media value such online stories. They insist that their journalists investigate and 
reinterpret these stories.
41
 There were a series of influential events that began from 
the expression of emotion online and were later picked up by the traditional media, 
such as those discussed Tang and Sampson’s study.
42
 This is in part because of the 
pressure on the traditional media from the Internet.
43
 The prominence of online 
emotional exposure both drives and enables the news media to pick up on these 
episodes. Even the People’s Daily (人民日报) has started responding to the ‘public 
opinion’ which forms online. A well-known example is that in the case of Tang Hui,
44
 
the microblog account of the People’s Daily supported Tang Hui in a post on 5 August 
8 
 
2012 in response to online sympathy for her and anger towards the local Yongzhou 
government. Benefiting from the publication of this post, the party organ’s microblog 
account attracted the most attention from Internet users since its launch in July 2012: 
this post was re-tweeted more than 130,000 times and received around 43,000 
comments from Internet users.
45
 In addition, the trend of the traditional media paying 
more attention to online sentiment is partly attributable to the willingness of 
journalists to cover public interest stories, increase journalistic autonomy in their 
work, and to report professionally.
46
 According to journalists who have reported on 
the events mentioned in this article, overall there are three reasons why they think 
they should report on them.
47
 Firstly, if an event is a hot topic online, it represents the 
opinions of the public, which the news media cannot afford to ignore. Secondly, most 
events of this kind fit news value/newsworthiness criteria, such as unpredictability, 
negativity, the fact that elites (such as officials) are involved, conflict, and social 
proximity. And finally, the Internet creates difficulties for governments who try to ban 
reporting on such events. Therefore opportunities arise for the development of 
professional, quality journalism. The expression of emotions online acts as a news 
hook for their reports. 
As a result, there is an increasing tendency for events to be first discussed 
heatedly and emotionally on the Internet and later reported by the traditional media, 
whose coverage in turn triggers more online discussions and stirs more online 
emotions. The interaction between Internet users and media reports often leads to an 
upward spiral development of events, as a deputy editor-in-chief of a commercial 
news magazine commented, in the case of Guo Meimei: 
 
Weibo users Microbloggers raised questions and showed scepticism about the possible 
relationships between Guo Meimei and Red Cross-associated enterprises, with obvious 
anger and hatred of corruption. Afterwards, journalists interviewed the Red Cross and 
commercial Red Cross-associated companies, and fed explanations and answers back 
to the Internet to answer microbloggers’ questions. The answers and explanations 
published by journalists became new evidence and the basis for microbloggers’ to raise 





Both the Internet and the news media are indispensible for such an interaction. 
Without the existence of the Internet, the news media may not have been able to cover 
such stories. Without the coverage of the news media, however, Internet users cannot 
be connected with mainstream politics, and the voices of Internet users cannot reach 
the centres of political power. This kind of interaction has emancipatory potential in 
various ways. It holds the powerful accountable, and it pushes governments and 
officials to respond to online emotions and sentiments, as exemplified in the cases 
discussed here. The expression of emotions opposes the dominant official discourse 
on relevant issues which supports the domination of the ruling party on the one hand, 




The formation of an agonistic public sphere 
 
The interaction between the Internet and the news media in China takes place in the 
public sphere. However, this cannot really be seen as a Habermasian public sphere. 
Firstly, a prominent aspect of the former sphere is the importance of private 
individuals’ emotional expressions about private issues, rather than that of rational 
debates on public matters. The significance of emotions and private interests contrasts 
rationality and publicity that are at the centre of the Habermasian concept of the 
public sphere. Secondly, in this space, although information access is considerably 
easier and freer than previously, it is still inhibited by political control. Thirdly, the 
public discourses that are forged in this sphere are contesting one another rather than 
forming consensus. Finally, this sphere is not premised on differentiation of the state 
from the privatized/capitalist market economy, an essential aspect of Habermas’s 
public sphere.
49
 Instead, this sphere is close to an agonistic public sphere in Mouffe’s 
terms, because of the prominence of emotions and plural and contesting discourses as 
well as contestation against dominant social groups and individuals.  
    In an authoritarian society such as China that has a strong state but a weak 
society, this public sphere is important sociopolitically. Emotions expressed in this 
space are good for China’s public life as they hold the state accountable and break 
down the dominance of official ideology. In China, expressing emotions itself is a 
practice of citizenship and a nurturing of the consciousness of resistance. In this way, 
the ‘organic’ expression of emotions – especially those on the Internet – is turning the 
‘hidden script’ of resistance into a ‘public script’.
50
 Individual experience is given the 
opportunity to come under national or even international scrunity, which might forge 
collective resistance against the domination of social institutions and individuals. In 
addition, access to social resources makes the expression of emotions powerful, as 
demonstrated in all the cases discussed in this article. Though the powerless and the 
elites are differently wired in networks and they occupy different positions and thus 
benefit from such networks to different degrees, members of these elites – either 
economic, political and cultural elites and institutions, or government departments 
such as the police, that are located in the central nodes of networks – are much more 
contactable than before. Those who are powerless now have greater access to the elite, 
implying the potential to organize social resources effectively to address their needs. 
In addition, strong emotions can formulate a plurality of discourses that contest each 
other and pressure authorities to act, creating the potential to change the existing 
power structures in a repressive society. Especially for less privileged people, who 
have had no chance to speak out in an era dominated by the traditional media, an 
agonistic public sphere comprising both cyberspace and space for the traditional 
media is a way for them to make their voices heard. 
Public emotions of this kind are public opinions expressed in an emotional way 
rather than forged in the rational debates that are crucial to a successful deliberative 
democracy. Such sentimental public opinions embody individuals’ direct or indirect 
personal experience, their political and social perceptions and their reflections on their 
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own position in society. They mix both reflex and moral emotions, as described by 
Jasper and his collaborators.
51
 The power of such emotions was shown in the case of 
Zhang Jinzhu
52
 in 1997 as well as the case of Sun Zhigang
53
 in 2003. The authorities 
are afraid of this type of power that is overwhelming and collective, and thus have to 
make changes. In this sense, emotions have their democratic functions. They are 
politically meaningful and should therefore not be dismissed. 
However, the agonistic public sphere has its own limitations stemming from the 
influence of existing social and media conditions. Firstly, the traditional media 
respond to online emotional expressions according to their own paradigms and 
journalistic values, which are themselves limited. For example, an analysis of the 
news reports on the high-speed train accident in 2011 in the Southern Metropolitan 
Daily (南方都市报) and the Wenzhou Metropolitan Daily (温州都市报) reveals that 
the two newspapers have cited user-generated content about the high-speed train crash 
incident in different ways according to their own journalistic values and practice 
paradigms
54
. In addition, driven by the news media’s commercial logic, it is possibile 
that reports of this kind reflect the interest of the public rather than the public interest. 
This possibility could lead to sensationalism and further tabloidization of the news 
media. 
Secondly, inequalities exist in terms of Internet access, usage and effects.
55
 Most 
Internet users in China live in cities and are well educated and well paid.
56
 Migrant 
labourers, laid-off workers and other low-income social groups make up the 
information have-less in China’s urban areas. How these information have-nots and 
have-less benefit from the Internet depends on how they use the Internet, for what 
purposes, how much existing resources they have in the ‘real’ world and what 
positions they occupy in the social hierarchy.
57
 The effects of communication over 
the Internet are influenced by the existing social structure. 
The Chinese government’s propaganda control also extends to the virtual space 
through regulations, the blocking of politically sensitive online content and 
requirement that Internet portals and service providers exercise self-censorship.
58
 In 
many cases, sensitive information and Web posts have been quickly removed. 
Bloggers who create and circulate sensitive content have been blocked and their 
accounts have been closed. Along with harsh measures imposed on the media since 
2013, the functioning of the agonistic public sphere is precarious.  
 
A case study of demolition and self-immolation in Yihuang 
 
This section looks into the Yihuang incident to illustrate what has already been 
discussed above. This case study offers an understanding of an agonistic public sphere 
in action.  
In 2010 in Yihuang county, three members of the Zhong family burned 
themselves as a protest against the local authority’s plan to demolish their home by 
force. One died and the other two were severely injured. The local government tried 
to cover up the tragedy and attempted to stop Zhong Rujiu and her sister – two 
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daughters of the family – from flying to Beijing to petition. When the local media 
remained silent, the tragedy was revealed on the Internet. Out-of-town media, such as 
the Southern Metropolitan Daily and the Xiaoxiang Morning Herald (潇湘晨报), sent 
their journalists to investigate. When local officials prevented Zhong Rujiu and her 
sister at the airport from taking a flight to Beijing, Deng Fei, an investigative 
journalist at the Phoenix Weekly (凤凰周刊), posted messages about what happened in 
the airport via SinaWeibo in real time. His microblogs, however, were deleted by Sina 
later that day. Soon afterwards, Zhong Rujiu set up her own SinaWeibo profile, posted 
updates about the situation in Yihuang and news of the victims, uploaded pictures and 
on-site audio recordings to the Internet, and appealed for help and attention from the 
public. Some members of the cultural and economic elites, such as Deng Fei and Pan 
Shiyi,
59
 forwarded her messages to their large groups of followers. What the Zhong 
family went through triggered a great outpouring of anger by Internet users and 
attracted much coverage in the traditional media. Pressure generated on the Internet 
led to negotiations between the Zhong family and the local authority as well as the 
dismissal of the local governor of Yihuang county. 
The Zhong family occupies a lower position in China’s social hierarchy. They 
had few resources available for appealing for justice. They even chose to burn 
themselves to show their resistance against the powerful local authority. Therefore, 
the Zhong family was powerlessly atomized on the margins of society. After they had 
attracted massive attention from online users and the traditional media, the support of 
ordinary online users, the mass media and some members of the elite ensured that 
they were no longer completely powerless in the face of the authorities. With the help 
of the Internet, they also obtained access to resources that they would not otherwise 




Although individuals can opt to express their emotions online, not all expressions 
are heard by others nor can they trigger collective emotions. Such individual 
expressions have to draw the attention of elites in order to engage the wider society. In 
this case, the involvement of members of the elite, such as Deng Fei, Pan Shiyi and 
many others, magnified the impact of the case. When the two daughters were blocked 
in the airport, Deng Fei even strongly encouraged Zhong Rujiu to do what he thought 
might capture the attention of the public and media, using his judgement as an 
experienced jouranlist. The case would not have become so influential without the 
help and instruction of Deng Fei, since he knew what the media and the public wanted, 
and how to effectively use the media to produce sociocultural resonance and shape the 
public discourse on injustice.
61
 The traditional media carried out further 
investigations, put all the information they collected together, and gave the wider 
audience the full story of what had happened and explained why. A wide range of 
officials, especially those at higher adminstrative levels, were interviewed and their 
comments were quoted in these news reports. 
The whole affair was driven by emotions, especially anger and compassion were 
evident in commentaries, rather than rational debate, and these were expressed in 
cyberspace and the traditional media. In the process, the experience of the Zhong 
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family publicized online directly and quickly triggered the public’s reflex and moral 
emotions in a mix of anger, compassion and hatred towards the government and 
officials. The following post is a typical example: 
 
I read the news this morning and saw this one ‘demolition caused three to burn 
themselves in Yihuang Jiangxi, no officials and policemen on the ground tried to save 
them’. I cried, what kind of society is this, are they any better than bandits, are you 
bandits or something else? None of these fuck figures [of GDP] is associated with the 
sweat and blood of peasants and miners and with the tears of residents whose houses are 
demolished, you son of a bitch, I fuck you. 
 
The poster expressed his/her strong sympathy for the victims and disadvantaged 
people as well as vitriolic anger towards governments, officials and policemen, 
including the use of swear words. 
Such reflex and moral emotions have roots in the context of Chinese society. In 
recent years, demolition has become a pressing issue that has increasingly pitted 
fiercely resistant residents defending their homes against highly determined officials, 
embodying injustices that every ordinary Chinese person may encounter in daily 
life.
62
 The Yihuang incident thus was sociocultural resonant event in itself, let alone 
the sad loss of life, which easily triggered human compassion. Zhong Jiuru’s creative 
use of texts and audio recordings on the Internet, which vividly displayed victims’ 
fear and local authorities’ brutality, also effectively created sociocultural resonance 
with other Internet users. On this score, the Internet functioned to broadcast live what 
happened in Yihuang dramatically through words, pictures and audio recordings on 
screen. Coverage by the traditional media, such as the publication of the previously 
beautiful but now dreadful images of the victims’ terribly burned faces, and reports on 
their suffering and the brutality of local officialdom, further added credibility to, and 
even endorsed, the descriptions of the case provided by journalists and by the Zhong 
family on the Internet. 
Nevertheless, the bottom-up push from society in this agonistic public sphere has 
in practice encountered barriers in the real world. Political and institutional 
interference and the stubbornness of the political authorities were the two main 
constraining factors. For its part, Sina practised self-censorship: the commercial 
portal’s response to a request from the state was to delete relevant microblogs and 
close down accounts. In addition, and more fundamentally, despite the fact that local 
politicians were dismissed in this specific case, the reality of the frequent demolitions 
affecting people in China has not changed much. What further angered the public was 
that the governors of Yihuang county, who were dismissed in 2010 because of this 
case, were reappointed to other political positions in 2011, which the media described 
as ‘another element that arouses the anger of the public’.
63
 
This case – as well as other cases discussed in this article – expressed and 
triggered a feeling of insecurity among Chinese citizens and their scepticism of the 
authorities’ motives and commitment to justice.
64
 It also reflects the resistance of the 
powerless against the dominant powers in the Chinese system. The Internet and news 
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media have faciliated such resistance. In this case, we can see the agonistic public 
sphere in action and the roles of different actors – the Internet, news media, journalists 




This article has reviewed China’s public life in recent years and evaluated the 
importance of the Internet and news media in channelling the expression of emotions. 
The concept of an agonistic public sphere is applicable to the case of China. In this 
public sphere, conflicting interests and emotions are contested and paradoxes in 
society are exposed. The prevalence of emotions has become a need as well as an 
indicator for the formation of the public sphere. 
Emotions accumulated in the course of economic reform urgently need a 
platform for expression and to be released. The traditional media alone, however, are 
unlikely to fulfil these needs, due to limitations inherent in their role as instruments of 
propaganda. Meanwhile in spite of offering more space and opportunities for ordinary 
people to express their views and emotions, online virtual space on its own is isolated 
from the dominant social and political fields. In a public sphere where both the 
Internet and traditional media are present, the expression and exploration of emotions 
provides the potential and means for ordinary people to challenge the hegemonic 
position of authorities, powerful individuals and institutions. 
Faciliatated by the Internet, Chinese people from lower social positions are able 
to seize certain opportunities to practise the ‘arts of resistance’ in public space.
65
 The 
Internet connects atomized individuals and unites them, pouring their invididual 
power into the collective pool. For those who have the knowledge and are willing to 
to use the Internet, they have the opportunity to organize and integrate fragmented 
social resources into a whole. They are able to air their angry feelings about injustices, 
mock the authorities, and salute grass-roots heroes such as Chen Guangcheng. 
Meanwhile, the involvement of the traditional media facilitates online communication 
with a wider audience. By conducting investigations into topical issues as well as 
interviews with relevant actors involved, the traditional media can bring attention to 
and utilize the information gathered and emotions expressed on the Internet and direct 
these to the attention of political leaders at the top. 
Such a practice of resistance makes a contribution to breaking down what 
Giddens calls the ‘naturalization of the present’.
66
 When the Chinese people neither 
recognize the ideological values propagated by the CCP nor accept the current 
situation as their destiny, the CCP is in danger of losing its hegemony. This is a way to 
denaturalize the power hierarchy, in which emotions function as a sort of link and 
bond among Chinese online users. In cases which resonate with online users, the 
resulting public outcries can mobilize people to express their feelings on social issues. 
Such mobilization not only offers discourses different from those in the traditional 
media, but also puts pressure on the powerful and privileged to change the status quo. 
Of course, the effects of an agonistic public sphere vary from case to case as well 
14 
 
as from time to time, due to the limitations imposed by existing conditions, such as 
reporting restrictions, Internet users’ skills and willingness to use new media 
technologies, as well as their actual social positions. Whether and to what extent the 
expression of emotions and the creation of an agonistic public sphere can lead China 
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